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PIRATES, BLACKWATER AND MARITIME SECURITY:
THE RISE OF PRIVATE NAVIES IN RESPONSE TO
MODERN PIRACY
Michael L Mineau *

I.

INTRODUCTION

This essay examines the controversial rise of private security
companies (PSCs) available for hire to maritime shipping companies in
response to the troubling increase in piratical attacks over the past 15 years in
dangerous shipping routes, such as the Gulf of Aden and the Straits of Malacca.
This introduction briefly highlights current trends in modem piracy, the scope
of piracy and its impact on the maritime shipping industry, and the
consequential growth of the market for maritime private security as a potential
solution to the problem. Section II identifies the major maritime PSCs that have
begun providing services in the Straights of Malacca and off the Hom of Africa.
Section III assesses the legal and practical concerns that critics have with the
use of maritime PSCs. The legal issues of liability and jurisdiction are analyzed
in Section IV. Finally, Section V concludes with the presentation of several
possible solutions to the legal and practical issues that currently surround the
use of PSCs to defend against piracy and several potential benefits of using
PSCs.
2008 was a shocking year statistically. According to the International
Maritime Bureau (IMB) Piracy Reporting Centre (PRC), an independent arm of
the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC), there were more hijacked
vessels and hostages taken in 2008 than in any other year since the PRC began
reporting on worldwide piracy statistics in 1992.1 In 2008, there were 293 total

* Michael L Mineau. I would like to thank all of the brilliant admiralty professors at the Roger
Williams University School of Law, including Jonathan Gutoff, William Coffee, Robert Falvey, and
everyone in the Marine Affairs Institute. I would also like to thank professor Cecily Banks, my
parents for their tremendous support and the love of my life, Nicole.
1 ICC Commercial Crime Services, IMB Reports UnprecedentedRise in Maritime Hjyackings (Jan.
16 2009), availableat http://www.iccccs.org/index.php?option=comcontent&view-article&id=332:imb-reports-unprecedented-rise-inmaritime-hijackings&catid=60:news&Itemid=51 (last visited May 2, 2009).
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attacks against ships - up 11% from the 263 total attacks against ships in 2007.
The categorical breakdown of the 2008 numbers is equally concerning - 49
vessels were hijacked, 889 crew members were taken hostage, 46 vessels were
fired upon, 11 crew members were killed, and 21 crew members went missing.3
While many maritime nations have deployed coalition warships as part
of a NATO flotilla to parts of the Gulf of Aden to address the problem of
privacy there, the Associated Press (AP) reported in October 2008 that "the
growing interest among merchant fleets to hire their own firepower is
encouraged by the U.S. Navy and represents a new and potentially lucrative
market for security firms scaling back operations in Iraq." 4 Even with the
increased presence of the coalition warships patrolling the waters off the Hom
of Africa, the U.S. Navy admits that the limited coalition fleet can only patrol a
small percentage of the 2.5 million square miles of waters off the Hom of
Africa. Lt. Nate Christensen of the U.S. 5th Fleet actually expressed to the AP
his support of the use of PSCs by shipping companies: "This is a great trend...
We would encourage shipping companies to take proactive measures to help
ensure their own safety." ,6 Over 20,000 vessels pass through the Gulf of Aden
each year.
While there are a host of legitimate legal and policy concerns
surrounding the use of maritime PSCs, the commercial shipping industry may
soon be relying more on PSCs to ensure safe passage through dangerous waters
than on the promise of further international state action.8 Because the
international liner shipping industry is such a vital part of worldwide
transportation, it is not surprising that many shipping and marine insurance

2

Id.

3

Id.

4 Katharine Houreld, After Iraq, Security Firms Join Somalia Piracy Fight: Pirate Coast of Africa

Offers New Frontierfor Security Firms Looking Beyond Iraq, The Associated Press via USA
TODAY
(Oct. 26, 2008), available at http://www.usatoday.com/news/world/2008-10-262583935117 x.htm (last visited March 23, 2010).
5 Id.
6 Id.
7 InternationalPiracy on the High Seas: Hearing Before the H. Subcomm. on Coast Guard and
Maritime Transportation, 111th Cong. (Feb. 4, 2009) [hereinafter WSC Hearing] (statement of
Christopher Koch, President & CEO of the World Shipping Council).
8 See James H. Hohenstein, Private Security Companies at Sea: Unseen and Unregulated,
International Bar Association, Maritime and Aviation Law Section, Maritime and Transportation
Law Committee, Session: Piracy and Crimes at Sea including Pollution Liability (Oct. 18, 2007),
available at
http://74.125.95.132/search?q=cache:1aOhlUkZ3JQJ:www.ebalawyers.com.au/system/files/downloa
d/o81/SIN87.pdf+%/o22private+security%/22+sea+piracy&cd=7&hl=en&ct clnk&gl-us (last visited
May 3, 2009).
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companies are considering the costs and benefits of the use of PSCs. 9 As
Christopher Koch, President and CEO of the World Shipping Council (WSC),
emphasized to the House Subcommittee on Coast Guard and Maritime
Transportation in a February 2009 hearing on piracy, "liner shipping is the heart
of a global transportation system that connects American companies and
consumers with the world."10 The liner shipping sector of the maritime
shipping industry, which transports more than half of the $1.8 trillion in U.S.
ocean-borne commerce each year, has been identified by the U.S. Department
of Homeland Security as part of the nation's "critical infrastructure."" In U.S.
ports each day, over 50,000 container loads of imports and exports are handled,
involving nearly 175 countries. 12 According to Koch, "liner shipping generates
more than one million American jobs and $38 billion in annual wages."l 3
The recent explosion of media coverage on piratical attacks in the Gulf
of Aden has likely dispelled many public misconceptions about modem piracy.
However, the WSC has made a concerted effort to educate its liner shipping
company members about the militant weapons and tactics that modem pirates
are using to approach targeted commercial vessels, board and hijack those
vessels, and take crew members hostage.14
Piratical attacks usually occur at dusk or dawn, when visibility is
low.1 " Vessels operating at lower speeds - at or below 15 knots - are at the
highest risk of piratical attacks, because high-speed pirate skiffs deployed from
mother ships often can reach speeds of up to 25 knots. 16 "Pirates employ
machine guns, rifles and rocket propelled grenades (RPGs) and attempt to slow
or stop target ships by firing on them so the pirates can then use grappling hooks
and portable ladders to get on board."17 Protection and indemnity (P&I) clubs,
which are cooperative marine insurance organizations that collectively insure
against third party losses, often are left with no choice but to make large ransom
payments to pirates in exchange for the safe return of hijacked vessels, crew,
and cargoes. 1

The market for maritime PSCs as a potential solution to the problem of

See International: Private Firm May Have Anti-piracy Role, Oxford Analytica (Dec. 4, 2008),
available at http://www.oxan.com/display.aspx?ItemlD=DB147444 (last visited May 3, 2009).
10

WSC Hearing, supra note 7.

11Id.
12 Id.
13 Id.

14 See id.
15 Id.
16 id.
17 id.
18 Id.

65

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 2010

3

Journal of International Business and Law, Vol. 9, Iss. 1 [2010], Art. 3
THE JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS & LAW

piracy seems to have grown out of a climate of necessity and desperation. The
next section identifies the major private contractors that have responded to this
demand for a more cost-effective, comprehensive, and viable solution to the
problem of modem piracy that has placed such an enormous strain on the
commercial shipping and marine insurance industries.

II. MAJOR MARITIME PSCS
Although any information about specific contracts between shipping
companies and maritime PSCs is highly secretive and difficult to obtain, many
of the major PSCs have recently been advertising their services to shipping
companies and the general public.
XE Corporation (formerly "Blackwater Worldwide"19), which has
endured a considerable amount of public scrutiny after being investigated for its
role in a number of civilian shootings in Iraq, is one of the major companies that
have entered the maritime private security market to assist vessels in defending
against piracy at sea. 20 In October 2008, Blackwater unveiled its new 183-foot
vessel, the McArthur, announcing to shipping companies that it would be
available for hire to provide escort services and defense from piratical attacks.21
The McArthur, a former decommissioned National Oceanic and Atmospheric
Administration (NOAA) research vessel, was purchased by Blackwater in 2006
and refurbished into the high-tech security vessel it is today.22 Some of the
advanced features of the McArthur include:
state-of-the-art navigation systems, full Global Maritime
Distress and Safety System communications,
SEATEL
broadband satellite communications, dedicated command and
control battlefield air support, helicopter decks, a hospital,
multiple support vessel capabilities, and a crew of 45 highly

Blackwater Worldwide changed its name to XE (pronounced like the letter "Z") in early 2009.
See US securityfirm mired in Iraq controversy changes its name: Blackwater Worldwide renamed
XE as company tries to salvage its tarnished brand, The Associated Press via THE GUARDIAN UK
(Feb. 13, 2009), available at http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2009/feb/13/blackwater-changesname-xe (last visited May 3, 2009). Note that throughout this essay, the names "Blackwater
Worldwide," "Blackwater" and "XE" are used interchangeably and should be construed as such.
20 See Houreld, supra note 4.
21 Jerry Seper, Blackwater Joins Fight Against Sea
Piracy, The WASH. TIMES (Dec. 4, 2008),
available at http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2008/dec/04/blackwater-joins-fight-againstsea-piracy/(last visited May 3, 2009).
19

22 Id.
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trained personnel. 23

According to Anne Tyrrell, a Blackwater spokesperson, the company
has received over 70 requests from commercial shipping and marine insurance
companies for more information about the McArthur and Blackwater's
services. 24
Blackwater spokespeople directly attribute recent increases in shipping
costs to the increase of piratical attacks off the Horn of Africa. 25 The severe
risk of piracy in that region has also translated into a tenfold increase in marine
26
insurance premiums for ships transiting the Gulf of Aden.
Some marine
insurance firms have offered to reduce premium costs by as much as 40 percent
for any vessels hiring private security.27
One of the largest and most established maritime PSCs, Background
Asia Risk Solutions, was the first maritime PSC to open for operations in
Singapore28 after Lloyd's of London labeled the Straits of Malacca a "war-risk
zone" in 2005.29 Background Asia Risk Solutions is one of a number of PSCs
that are routinely hired to provide escort services and chartered patrol boats to
accompany large cargo vessels and tankers through the dangerous Strait.30

PSCs operating in the region also have advertised the ability to deploy security
forces from helicopters to recover hijacked vessels and oil rigs.31
Background Asia Risk Solutions charges approximately $100,000 per
escort mission - a figure much lower than the average ransom payment in the
area of $120,000 for the safe return of a kidnapped vessel's master.3 2 Many of
the security personnel that Background Asia Risk Solutions hires are former
military and law enforcement personnel from the United States and Britain.33
HollowPoint Protective Services, which is based out of Mississippi, is

23
24
25
26
27

Id.
Id.
Id.
Houreld, supranote 4.

Id.

28 Private Navies Combat Malacca Strait Pirates: Waterway Now So Dangerous For Shipping,

Lloyd's Classifies Major Seaway As Warzone, WorldNetDaily (Jul. 31, 2005), available at
http://www.worldnetdaily.com/news/article.asp?ARTICLE ID=45535 (last visited May 3, 2009).
29 Andrew Marshall, Waterway To the World Modern trade, ancient traditionsand lawless habits
collide in the planet's most crucial choke point: the Malacca Strait, TIMEasia (Jul. 31, 2006),
available at http://www.time.com/time/asia/2006/journey/strait2.html (last visited May 3, 2009).
30 PrivateNavies CombatMalaccaStrait Pirates,supra note 28.
31 Id.
32 Id.

33 Id.
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another maritime PSC that began advertising its services in the Gulf of Aden3 4
following the shocking September 2008 hijacking of the Ukrainian MV Faina
by Somali pirates.35 The MV Faina was carrying 33 tanks, in addition to other
highly valuable cargo.3 6 The CEO of HollowPoint, John Harris, has received
several recent requests from shipping companies for more information about the
company's security capabilities off the Horn of Africa.3 7 "We'll get your crew
and cargo back to you, whether through negotiations or through sending a team
in," Harris told the AP in 2008.3
In January 2009, a sister company of HollowPoint , HP Terra-Marine
International, secured a licensing agreement with Yemen to operate out of
several of that state's ports.39 As a result, HP Terra-Marine has been able to use
Yemen's ports to transport its security forces by boat to safely and efficiently
load and off-load its security personnel onboard its client's vessels. 40 When
pressed by Anderimar Shipping News on whether HollowPoint has already
provided private security operations to shipping company clients in the Gulf of
Aden, John Harris would neither confirm nor deny any specifics about
HollowPoint's services provided to date. 4 1 "Due to security demands and
operational integrity we are not at liberty to discuss specifics of said attacks,"
Harris remarked.42 However, the HollowPoint CEO stressed the high level of
training and experience of its skilled security forces, adding that HollowPoint's
"longevity in the protection and security industry is due to our success at what
we do." 43
Another maritime PSC which has been rapidly expanding operations in
the Gulf of Aden is Drum Cussac, which earned its reputation in the maritime
community by providing security services to luxury yachts, including the

34

Houreld, supranote 4.

35 International:Private Firm May Have Anti-piracy Role, supra note 9.
36 Id.
37 Houreld,
38 id.

supranote 4.

39 HollowPoint Protective Services, LLC Secures Agreement to Operate Marine Security From

Yemen,
The
MAR. ExEc.
(Feb. 5, 2009), available at http://www.maritimeexecutive.com/pressrelease/hollowpoint-protective-services-llc-through-its-sister-company-securesoperational-agreements-operate-marine-security-yemen-2009-02-05/ (last visited May 3, 2009).
40 id.
41 See "Ships Need Armed Guards, " Says Security Firm
Chief Mar. Global Net (Oct. 20, 2008),
available at http://www.mgn.com/news/dailystorydetails.cfn?storyid=9283&type=2 (last visited
May 3, 2009).
42 id.
43 Id.
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French yacht Le Ponant which was hijacked in April 2008.44 Drum Cussac's
business doubled over the course of 2008 as bulk carriers and oil tankers began
contacting the company to hire armed guards to provide onboard security to
merchant vessels transiting the Gulf of Aden.45
Olive Group, a PSC based out of London, which has previously been
responsible for providing security services to Shell Corporation in Iraq, also
entered the maritime PSC market in 2008. 46 Olive Group is now offering to
provide security to vessels transiting the Gulf of Aden region.47 Crispian Cuss,
the Olive Group security consultant, has suggested that armed security
personnel onboard vessels act as a deterrent to potential hijackers. 48 He said,
"No client's ship has been approached by pirates while we've been on them." 49
Hart Security is another maritime PSC that announced a recent
partnership with Swinglehurst Ltd., a marine insurance provider, to provide
comprehensive "all round protection on voyages in the Gulf of Aden."so Under
this agreement, ship-owners who have contracted with Hart to provide security
in the Gulf of Aden are now entitled to War Risk Coverage on any pirate attacks
against their vessels." Including piracy within the meaning of War Risk Cover
greatly reduces insurance rates. 52
The expansion and shift in focus of many security contractors to
respond to the global threat of piracy signals an emerging market for these
services in the private sector. The next section identifies some of the major
legal and practical concerns with employing the use of maritime PSCs.
III. LEGAL AND PRACTICAL CONCERNS WITH EMPLOYING
MARITIME PSCS
In the February 2009 piracy hearing before the House Subcommittee
on Coast Guard and Maritime Transportation, the WSC report indicates in a
footnote that shipping companies typically do not hire private security

44

Houreld, supranote 4.

45 Id.
46

Id.

47Id.
48Id.
49Id.
50 Press Release, Hart Security, Protected Gulf of Aden Voyages (Oct. 6, 2008), available at
http://www.hartsecurity.com/news.asp?rel= 1109 (last visited May 3, 2009).
51 d.
52 Id.
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contractors to defend against piratical attacks.53 The note then lists a host of
reasons why PSCs are not hired to provide maritime security.5 4 The first
concern presented is that the use of firearms could escalate situations, resulting
in loss of life.
While this proposition might be nothing more than mere
speculation at this stage, it gives rise to several other important questions. If
ship-owners are looking to increase security onboard their vessels by arming
someone, it might be better to rely on highly-trained professional contractors to
provide armed security than on arming inexperienced crew members not trained
in the array of skills that PSC personnel have. In the event of a piratical attack
on an unarmed cargo vessel, the arrival of a coalition warship ordering the
pirates to stand down might escalate a situation more than would the presence of
a handful of highly-trained and well-equipped private contractors. However,
these questions remain unsettled and highly controversial. No clear answer
exists to the question of whether the presence of armed security personnel
would tend to escalate situations or act as a deterrent. The use of arms and
liability are further discussed in Section IV.
Another concern with the use of PSCs is that many flag states
discourage the use of armed guards and also restrict commercial vessels from
carrying arms aboard.5 6 Members of the U.S. Navy have expressed their
support of the use of private security contractors. 7 Surprisingly, Somali official
Abdulkadir Muse Yusuf, the deputy marine minster of Puntland, has stated that
PSCs are "welcome" in Somalia's waters." Minister Yusuf even asserts that
the presence of PSC personnel might not only deter piracy in Somali waters but
also other harmful acts being committed off of Somalia's coast, such as illegal
fishing and waste dumping.5 9
The recent exclusive agreement between HollowPoint's subsidiary HP
Terra-Marine and the government of Yemen 60 might signal a new era of
partnerships between coastal states and private security contractors. By closely
regulating and monitoring the operations of PSCs, coastal states can ensure that
PSCs maintain the highest standards of professionalism and accountability,
while at the same time being able to generate tax revenue from these
companies' operations. By arming PSCs instead of crews, vessel owners also

5

WSC Hearing, supranote 7, at n.4.

54 See id.
"
56
1

Id.
Id.
See Houreld, supranote 4.

58 Id.

59 Id.
60

See HollowPointProtective Services, supra note 39.
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avoid the problem of entering port states with differing regulations on carrying
onboard weapons, placing this burden on PSCs. 6 1
Another argument against the use of PSCs is that many P&I insurers
discourage the use of armed guards.62 This position is not supported by any
citing authority in the WSC report. 63 Furthermore, several sources seem to
directly contradict this claim. The recent partnership between Hart Security, a
PSC, and Swinglehurst Ltd., a marine insurer, to provide War Risk Coverage to
vessels protected by Hart Security personnel is one example of the marine
insurance industry favoring the use of PSCs. 64 The move by marine insurers to
reduce charges for vessels by up to 40 percent if protected by private security is
another example of the insurance industry supporting PSCs at sea. 61
The WSC report also notes that the possibility of fire, explosion, or
sinking of vessels under attack is another argument against employing PSCs. 66
This concern is legitimate, but if insurers and shipping companies are trying to
avoid paying enormous ransoms for the safe return of vessels, crew, and cargo
by employing the use of PSCs, then any increased risk of fire, explosion, or
sinking can simply be calculated and factored into future insurance premiums.
The concern over hazardous cargo is also cited as a potential reason
why the use of PSCs should be discouraged.67 This argument does not
distinguish between PSC personnel actually aboard the vessels they are
protecting and PSC personnel aboard separate escort ships. Many of the PSCs
discussed in this essay have been advertising armed escort missions instead of
actual onboard security services. The liability issues surrounding the distinction
between onboard security and separate escort ships are further discussed in
Section IV.
Other concerns that the WSC report raises with respect to the use of
PSCs are some of the practical operational concerns, including "command and
control, rules of engagement, use of deadly force, weapons security, [and] intra
port/ship transfer of weapons and guards."68 These issues could all be
addressed through further cooperation between PSCs, port states, and the
international maritime community to establish uniform and clear protocol for

See David Isenberg, Yaargh, Here Be Contractors,CATO Institute (Oct. 24, 2008), available at
http://www.cato.org/pub display.php?pub id=9748 (last visited May 3, 2009).
62 WSC Hearing, supra note
7, at n.4.
63 See WSC Hearing, supra
note 7.
64 See Press Release: ProtectedGulf ofAden Voyages,
supranote 50.
65 See Houreld, supra note
4.
66 WSC Hearing, supra note
7, at n.4.
61

67 Id.
68

Id.
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PSCs to follow.
Finally, numerous unresolved issues of liability and jurisdiction present
challenging questions about what legal regimes currently govern maritime PSCs
and the use of force by third-party security forces at sea. These issues are
discussed in the next section.
IV. LEGAL ISSUES OF JURISDICTION AND LIABILITY
GOVERNING PSCS AND PIRACY
One of the first legal issues raised by the unique situation of armed
security contractors defending commercial vessels against acts of piracy is over
what laws, if any, govern a PSC's right to carry arms and actively defend client
vessels. Traditional notions of self-defense do not seem to adequately cover
third-party security personnel, especially if a PSC officer exercises lethal force
against a pirate. 69 Additionally, no international agreements comprehensively
regulate the carriage of arms aboard vessels. 70 When operating on the high
seas, the flag state of a vessel retains exclusive jurisdiction over whether the
carriage and use of weapons is permitted onboard that vessel.71 Generally, a
vessel operating within a coastal state's territorial waters is governed by the
laws of the coastal state.72
Article 101 of the UN Convention of the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS)
defines "piracy" as:
(a) any illegal acts of violence or detention, or any act of
depredation, committed for private ends by the crew or the
passengers of a private ship or a private aircraft, and directed:
(i) on the high seas, against another ship or aircraft, or
against persons or property on board such ship or aircraft;
or
(ii) against a ship, aircraft, persons or property in a place
outside the jurisdiction of any State;
(b) any act of voluntary participation in the operation of a ship
or of an aircraft with knowledge of facts making it a pirate
69

See Hohenstein,supra note 8.

70 id.
71 id.
72

id.

72
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ship or aircraft;
(c) any act inciting or of intentionally facilitating an act
described in sub-paragraph (a) or (b).73
Under this definition, only acts committed on the high seas are
technically considered acts of piracy.74 Acts committed within a coastal state's
territorial waters or ports are not encompassed by the UNCLOS definition of
piracy. 5 However, the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts of
Violence Against the Safety of Maritime Navigation (SUA Convention) further
prohibits acts of violence against vessels in any waters and requires signatories
with jurisdiction over pirates, pirate ships, or piratical attacks to immediately
take offenders into custody for questioning or to extradite those offenders to
their home states. 76 The SUA Convention also requires cooperation between
member states so that acts of violence against ships do not go unpunished.
Nevertheless, UNCLOS and the SUA Convention only authorize states and
governmental forces to respond to piratical attacks through force and to arrest
pirate vessels; these conventions do not discuss whether PSCs may carry arms
aboard client vessels, escort ships, or whether PSCs may engage pirates either
before or after an act of piracy has occurred.
The International Ship and Port Facility Security (ISPS) Code also
does not discuss the "engagement or use of PSCs or the use of firearms on board
vessels, whether by members of the crew or hired guns, although the ISPS Code
recognizes that ships will employ outside contractors to provide security
services, especially in port." 7 1
The International Maritime Organization (IMO) has strongly
discouraged aggressive responses to piracy and the use of arms to defend
against piratical attacks,79 warning that "[t]he use of firearms requires special
training and aptitudes and the risk of accidents with firearms carried on board
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, art. 101, Dec. 10, 1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 397
[hereinafter UNCLOS].
74 See id.
7 See id.
76 See Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts of Violence Against the Safety of Maritime
Navigation (SUA Convention), available at
http://74.125.47.132/search?q=cache:3wMmZ8FPwqYJ:nti.org/e-research/official-docs/inventory/
pdfs/maritime.pdf+sua+convention+nti.org&cd=1&hl=en&ct-clnk&gl=us (last visited May 3,
2009).
7 See id.
78 Hohenstein, supra note 8.
7 Id.
73

73
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ship is great."so Although the above quoted IMO Maritime Security Committee
circular was published in 2002 and therefore probably does not fully account for
the unique piracy concerns that have developed off of the Hom of Africa in
more recent years, it correctly asserts that crew on merchant vessels are not
properly trained in the use of advanced weaponry. The quote actually supports
the argument that skilled private security personnel, many having elite military
training and combat experience, might be the best people to arm. The WSC has
urged passive defense tactics such as discharging water from fire hoses, zig-zag
maneuvering, and maximizing vessel speed," but these methods of evasion are
not always an effective defense. When pirates armed with advanced weapons
are determined to hijack a vessel at any cost, no amount of passive evasion will
adequately repel them.8 2 "When such a scenario develops while the vessel is
underway, no matter the resources of nearby governmental authorities, the only
practical (and effective) response is the presence of PSC personnel with the
'special training and aptitude' to deal with the threat."83
The liability governing PSCs varies significantly based on the vessel's
location.84 A PSC vessel on the high seas is governed exclusively by the laws
of the flag state of that vessel, including the regulation of firearms and PSC
personnel on board."
Therefore, any criminal acts committed by PSC
personnel on the high seas would be subject to prosecution in the flag state of
the vessel carrying the personnel. 86
When a PSC vessel or a merchant vessel carrying PSC personnel is in
port, the vessel "is subject to the laws of the port state."87 There are no
comprehensive international agreements that currently address the issue of
weapons aboard commercial vessels.
"In general terms, maritime nations
recognize the general principle of international comity, i.e., matters of a vessel's
internal management and discipline are not subjects of local concern or law."8 9
A port state's authorities typically only become involved in the event of some
type of disturbance. 90 The issue of comity was addressed in the famous

ORG., Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships, MSC Circular 623/Rev. 3, Annex,
45, 46 (May 29, 2002).
s1 WSC Hearing, supranote 7.
80

INT'L. MAR.

82

Hohenstein, supra note 8.

83 Id.
84
85
86
87

Id.
Id.
See id.
Id.

88 Id.
89 Id.
90 Id.

74
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Wildenhus' Case, where United States authorities arrested several crewmembers
of a Belgian ship after allegedly killing a fellow crew member while the vessel
was in a U.S. port. 91 In a writ of habeas corpus, the Belgian government sought
release of the crewmembers on grounds that Belgium maintained exclusive
jurisdiction over the internal management of the ship under a treaty between the
two governments. 92 The Supreme Court held that, because the "disorder"
aboard the Belgian vessel was enough to disturb the "tranquility" and "public
repose" of the state of New Jersey, the crew members could only exercise their
right of habeas corpus in U.S. courts and could not be released to the Belgian
government.93 As the Court stated in its opinion:
Disorders which disturb only the peace of the ship or those on
board are to be dealt with exclusively by the sovereignty of
the home of the ship, but those which disturb the public peace
may be suppressed, and, if need be, the offenders punished by
the proper authorities of the local jurisdiction. 94
Therefore, under the holding of this case and the general principles of
comity, any potential violent exchange between PSC personnel in port and and
pirates would likely result in the intervention by authorities of the port state. 95
Somalia presents a more difficult set of jurisdictional issues however, since,
according to the CIA World Factbook, Somalia has "no permanent national
government." 96 Additionally, with statements such as the one by minister
Yusuf of the semiautonomous region of Puntland welcoming PSCs into Somali
waters, 97 it is unclear what authorities, if any, could legitimately exercise
jurisdiction over PSC personnel in a Somali port.
Even more complicated jurisdictional issues are raised by a vessel
navigating an international strait, like the Straits of Malacca. 98 Whether arms
are prohibited aboard a vessel in an international strait depends on whether the
vessel is engaged in "transit passage" as opposed to "innocent passage" under

91See Mali, Consul of His Majesty the King of the Belgians v. Keeper of the Common Jail of
Hudson County, New Jersey, 120 U.S. 1 (1887) [hereinafter Wildenhus' Case].
92 See id.
93 See id.
94 Id.

See Hohenstein,supra note 8.
CIA World Factbook, Somalia, available at https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-worldfactbook/geos/so.html (last visited May 3, 2009).
97 See Houreld, supra note 4.
98 Hohenstein, supra note 8.
95
96
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the relevant provisions of UNCLOS. 99 Ships passing through international
straits are generally governed by the "transit passage" provisions of Part III of
UNCLOS, which states that:
Ships and aircraft, while exercising the right of transit
passage, shall:
(a) proceed without delay through or over the strait;
(b) refrain from any threat or use of force against the
sovereignty, territorial integrity or political independence
of States bordering the strait, or in any other manner in
violation of the principles of international law embodied
in the Charter of the United Nations;
(c) refrain from any activities other than those incident to
their normal modes of continuous and expeditious transit
unless rendered necessary by force majeure or by
distress;
(d) comply with other relevant provisions of this Part.100
However, because Indonesia, Singapore, and Malaysia, the coastal
states bordering the Malacca Straits, have all claimed to have sovereignty over
the Straits, a legitimate question exists over whether these waters might be
construed as the territorial waters of those three states instead of simply an
international straight.101 Vessels ordinarily passing though a state's territorial
waters are governed by the "innocent passage" provisions of UNCLOS, which
are far more restrictive than the "transit passage" provisions, prohibiting, among
other things, "any exercise or practice with weapons of any kind." 102 Therefore,
if navigation through the Malacca Strait is construed under the "innocent
passage" provisions of UNCLOS instead of the "transit passage" provisions,
then the ban on weapons would theoretically prevent PSCs or armed guards
from using or potentially even carrying weapons. 103 Subjecting a vessel passing
through the Malacca Straits to the territorial sovereignty of Indonesia,
Singapore, and Malaysia would also subject any PSCs onboard to the laws of

" See id.
100 UNCLOS, supra note 73, 1833 U.N.T.S. 397 at art. 39.1.
101 See Hohenstein, supra note 8.
102 UNCLOS, supra note 73, 1833 U.N.T.S.
397 at art. 19.2(c).
103 Hohenstein, supra
note 8.
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those three states, which all have strict laws governing the carriage of

weapons.104
The areas of the world where piracy is most prevalent, such as the
Hom of Africa and the Malacca Straits, present some of the most complicated
and unresolved jurisdictional issues concerning the use of maritime PSCs.
While the international community has not yet resolved some of these tough
questions, several possible solutions and some of the potential benefits of using
maritime PSCs are discussed in the next section.
V.

CONCLUSION

While the idea of vessel owners hiring armed private security forces
from a company like Blackwater to defend against piratical attacks remain
unpalatable and even unthinkable to many, a market has been created for
maritime PSCs due to the inability of the world's coastal states to control the
severe problem of piracy. Stabilizing Somalia by establishing a finctioning
government and empowering its citizens with aid and education is the likely
long-term solution to the ultimate problem of piracy currently breeding in
Somali coastal towns. However, such an enormous nation-building endeavor
will require years of cohesive and cooperative effort by the entire developed
world. In the immediate future, shipping companies are faced almost daily with
the threat of piratical attacks and the thought of having to negotiate expensive
and delicate ransom payments to pirates for the safe return of vessels, crew, and
cargo. While employing PSC personnel as armed security onboard liner vessels
is not an ideal and permanent solution to the explosion of piratical activity off
the coast of Somalia, it is one of many options that vessel owners are currently
considering. Maritime PSCs may be able to offer many potential benefits to the
shipping and marine insurance industries, as well as to all of the coastal
governments of the world. Some potential benefits of using PSCs are: 1) the
prevention of loss of life; 2) the prevention of loss of property; 3) that PSC
vessels could supplement the limited amount of NATO flotilla warships; 4) a
reduction in marine insurance premiums; 5) the possible prevention of future
terrorist attacks; 6) added stability to the unstable region of Somalia; 7) that
PSCs offer a sophisticated and efficient means of preventing piracy; and 8) the
ultimate reduction of the cost of consumer goods that will result with the
worldwide reduction of piracy.
Several possible solutions to the legal and practical issues of maritime
PSCs might in the future make the use of these companies more viable,
legitimate, and even preferred. One option is for flag state to license "sea
104See id.
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marshals" under some type of uniform international licensing regime, where
regulations and standards would govern weapons, engagement, personnel
training and qualification, and penalties.10
Another option is for an
international non-government organization or non-profit to closely monitor and
regulate PSC activities. 106 A third option, which would probably take at least
several years, would be for the United Nations to adopt a comprehensive
convention regulating PSCs and defining the areas where they are permitted to
operate. o7 As the international community is gradually beginning to consider
the potential concerns and benefits with vessel owners using maritime PSCs to
provide security in response to piracy, these companies continue to quietly
expand their operations, train additional personnel, acquire old ships and
refurbish them into high-tech security vessels, and enter into security contracts
with many of the world's largest shipping companies. While legitimate
concerns over territorial sovereignty make the use of PSCs problematic, the
navies of the world have been ineffective at preventing and combating piracy. 10
Therefore, the use of private security at sea is not only a viable option, but a
necessity for many shipping companies routinely facing this threat. Private
navies are on the rise, and the international community should respond to this
trend by uniting in a cooperative effort to reach some type of acceptable
compromise on how PSCs should be regulated. 109

105 Id.
106 Id.
107

Id.

108 See id.

109See id.
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